Chapter 13

 

1. Chapter 13 Plan
2. Chapter 13 Trustee
3. Child Support
4. Claim and issue preclusion--binding effect of plan
5. Dismissal or conversion
6. Disposable Income
7. Good Faith/Bad Faith
8. IRS
9. §109–Eligibility
10. §1322
11. §1325
12. §1325 (hanging paragraph)
13. Student Loans
14.  Fees
15.  Discharge-§ 1328
16. Misc

1. Chapter 13 Plan

In re Fridley, 380 B.R. 538, 544 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    The “applicable commitment period” of § 1325(b)(1) has a temporal component. “ A debtor desiring to prepay a chapter 13 plan and obtain an early discharge without paying allowed unsecured creditors in full must follow the § 1329 modification procedure prescribed by Rule 3015(g).”

In re Ransom, 336 B.R. 790 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)
    Chapter 13 plan which prohibited student loan creditor from collecting accrued interest after completion of the plan was a de facto discharge of the student loan debt, for which an adversary proceeding was required and a finding of undue hardship.  Thus, the provision is unenforceable.

In re Brawders, 325 B.R. 405 (9th Cir. BAP 2005), aff”d, 503 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2007)
    Debtors could not alter taxing authority’s lien rights on residence through a vague form plan provision that did not give adequate notice of debtor’s intent. Thus, “the res judicata effect of the Plan did nothing to reduce the amount of  Ventura’s underlying tax assessments or affect Ventura’s lien rights.”

In re Sunahara, 326 B.R. 768 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)
    A debtor may modify a confirmed 36-month chapter 13 plan so as to pay it off in a single lump sum and receive an early discharge.  Model plan which requires a 100% pay out to unsecured creditors if it extends less than 36 months is invalid.

In re Profit, 283 B.R. 567 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
    1. Under 1329(b)(1), a modified plan must meet some of the same requirements as an original plan, including the 60-month duration limit.
    2.  The 60-month period begins to run from the date the first plan payment is due.

In re Braker, 125 B.R. 798, (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1991)
    A Chapter 13 plan may not cure and reinstates a mortgage subsequent to a pre-petition foreclosure sale, but prior to the expiration of a statutory right of redemption

2. Chapter 13 Trustee

In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004)
    1. Chapter 13 trustee has standing to pursue avoiding actions for the benefit of the estate;
    2. The right to receive a tort settlement fund is neither a “payment intangible” nor an equitable assignment.

In re Powers, 202 B.R. 618 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996), amended .... (1997)
    Trustee need not show change in debtor’s circumstances in order to move for modification of debtor’s plan

In re Andrews, 49 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir. 1995)
    Chapter 13 trustee has standing to object if plan doesn’t comply with Title 11, even if none of creditors object

In re Andrews, 155 B.R. 769 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993), aff’d. 49 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir. 1995)
    Chapter 13 trustee has standing to object to plan extending beyond three years.  Court properly denied confirmation for lack of cause.

3. Child Support

In re Foster, 319 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2003)
    Interest on nondischargeable child support continues to accrue after a chapter 13 petition is filed and survives a chapter 13 discharge.

In re Pacana, 125 B.R. 19 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1991)
    Child support debt provided for in chapter 13 plan may be collected upon by claimant
 outside of plan.

4. Claim and issue preclusion--binding effect of plan

Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 530 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2008)
    Court indicates in dictum that a student loan creditor who receives adequate notice of a plan may be bound by it without the need for a dischargeability adversary proceeding.  However, the court specifically declines to decide this issue, because the discharge order specifically excepted from discharge the student loan in question.

Ellett v. Stanislaus, 506 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2007)
    Franchise Tax Board was not bound by debtor’s discharge for lack of proper notice, where debtor listed the wrong Social Security number on his bankruptcy petition and the wrong number appeared on his § 341(a) notice. 

In re Lynch, 363 B.R. 101 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    Trustee should not have been compelled to abandon property.  Even though the debtor valued the property at 560,000 as of the date of the filing of the  chapter 13 petition, and the  plan  was confirmed without objection, that valuation was not binding on the trustee under § 348(f)(1), since no implicit valuation occurred.  However, the relevant valuation date was the petition date, not the conversion date (absent a showing of bad faith).

In re Summerville, 361 B.R. 133 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    Where plan did not affect or address the validity of a note or deed of trust other than to cure arrearages and continue regular payments, debtor was not precluded from challenging the validity of note and deed of trust in subsequent state court action.

In re Ransom, 336 B.R. 790 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)
    Chapter 13 plan which prohibited student loan creditor from collecting accrued interest after completion of the plan was a de facto discharge of the student loan debt, for which an adversary proceeding was required and a finding of undue hardship.  Thus, the provision is unenforceable.
       
In re Enewally, 368 F.3d 1165,1165 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 669 (2004)
    “Although confirmed plans are res judicata to issues therein, the confirmed plan has no preclusive effect on issues that must be brought by an adversary proceeding, or were not sufficiently evidenced in a plan to provide adequate notice to the creditor.”   

In re Repp, 307 B.R. 144 (9th Cir. BAP 2004)
    Chapter 13 debtor’s plan could not discharge a partially-repaid student loan without giving the creditor the due process protections of an adversary proceeding.

In re Shook, 278 B.R. 815 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
    Debtor who failed to object to secured claim based on judgment lien after repeated notices from chapter 13 trustee was barred by laches from objecting after claim was paid.  Creditor's lien could not be avoided by plan alone, which in any event did not “provide for” the lien.

In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998), aff’d, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)
    Student loan creditor waived claim to postpetition interest by failing to object to discharge provision of debtor’s Chapter 13 plan before plan’s confirmation.
    “In summary, the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that a holder of a nondischargeable student loan was precluded from collecting postpetition interest on this debt if the creditor’s allowed claim is paid in full pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.  We are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bruning and reject the bankruptcy court’s reliance on Wasson.
    “However, this error was harmless given the facts of this case.  Although the Plan should not have been confirmed because it included the Discharge Provision, which was inconsistent with the Code, once confirmed, it was res judicata and binding on Appellant.  Additionally, Appellant’s failure to object to the Plan at the confirmation hearing constituted an implied acceptance of the Plan.  By failing to appeal the Confirmation Order and having impliedly accepted the Plan, Appellant cannot now collaterally attack the Plan.  Accordingly, we affirm.”

5. Dismissal or Conversion

In re Marrama, 549 U.S. 365, 127 S.Ct. 1105 (2007)
    Debtor forfeited his right to convert his case to chapter 13 where he did not qualify as a debtor because of his bad faith concealment of assets

In re Sobczak, 369 B.R. 519, 518 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    Court should not have considered interests of the debtor in determining whether to dismiss under § 1307(c).  It should only have considered the best interests of the estate and creditors.
   
In re Nelson, 343 B.R. 671 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)
    Dismissal  for cause under § 1307(c)(5) requires not only a denial of confirmation, but denial of a motion to file an amendment or modification of the plan. Debtor had to be given an opportunity to file an amended plan before dismissal was proper.

In re Tran, 309 B.R. 330 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004), aff’d, 177 Fed. Appx. 754 (9th Cir. 2006)
    Home refinancing proceeds revested in debtor after dismissal of chapter 13 petition; funds in chapter 13 trustee’s hands had to be turned over to the debtor.

In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999)
    Ch 13 bankruptcy debtor’s concealment of assets and inflation of expenses could amount to bad faith warranting dismissal of petition with prejudice.

In re Morimoto, 171 B.R. 85 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
    Dismissed for bad faith for failure to file tax returns was appropriate

In re Beatty, 162 B.R. 853 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
    Debtors dismissal before the order of conversion was docketed was effective

6. Disposable Income

In re Kagenveama, 527 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008)
    “Projected disposable income” as defined by § 1325(b)(2) means disposable income projected over the “applicable commitment period.” It is not a forward looking concept that is a mere starting point for determining whether aa above-median income debtor’s plan must be five years in duration as a condition to confirmation.

In re Wiegand, 386 B.R. 238 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)
    Official Form 22C, which allows an individual debtor in a chapter 13 case to deduct business expenses from income generated from a business, conflicts with § 1325(b)(2)(B), which allows the deduction of business income for purposes of determining disposable income, and is thus invalid.

In re Ransom, 380 B.R. 799 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    In determining “projected disposable income” of an above-median income debtor in a chapter 13 case, the means test does not permit the debtor to claim a vehicle ownership expense for a vehicle owned free and clear of any liens.

In re Hull, 251 B.R. 726 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)
    Debtor's community property interest under Washington law in the income of his nondebtor spouse is part of his “disposable income” and must be counted in calculating whether he meets the test of § 1322(a)(1) and § 1325(b)(1)(B).

In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999)
    Nonexempt assets from sale of house not subject to inclusion in plan as disposable income.  (Not clear from decision whether some other ground, such as liquidation test, might justify trustee motion to modify plan).

In re Than, 215 B.R. 430 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
    1. § 1329 does not require changed financial circumstances, but merely changed circumstances
    2. Debtor need not meet disposable income test in a plan modification where no objection to confirmation of the original plan was made on those grounds.

In re Hagel, 184 B.R. 793 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
    Debtor’s social security disability income included in disposable income, even though exempt

In re Anderson, 21 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994)
    Debtor need only devote his projected rather than actual disposable income for 36 months

7. Good Faith/Bad Faith

In re Villanuevo, 274 B.R. 836 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
    Debtor's proposal to reduce chapter 13 repayment plan from 60 to 36 months, thereby reducing percentage to unsecured creditors from 50% to 19%, did not indicate bad faith or lack of best efforts.

In re Ho, 274 B.R. 867 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
    1.  “While a dispute as to liability will not “necessarily render a debt unliquidated,” In re Slack, 187 F.3d at 1074, the nature of this dispute does.”  2.  Bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not applying all four of the Eisen factors in finding bad faith.

In re Scovis, 249 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2001)
    “....[E]ligibility would normally be determined by the debtor’s originally filed schedules, checking only to see if the schedules were made in good faith.”  Court also assumed that a lien would be partially avoided under § 522(f), rendering the debtor over the unsecured debt limit.

In re Padilla, 213 B.R. 349 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
    Timing of Chapter 13 case filed immediately after entry of adverse judgment in prior Chapter 7 case was not conclusive evidence of bad faith.

In re Eisen, 14 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 1994)
    Bad faith filing

8. IRS

In re Fowler, 394 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2005)
    “We hold that § 348(d) requires that postpetition employment tax debt, incurred as an administrative expense of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate, retains its first priority administrative expense status upon conversion to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.  Section 1305 is not in conflict with this holding because it does not govern the priority of the postpetition claims it allows into the bankruptcy.”

U.S. I.R.S. v. Snyder, 343 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2003)
    Debtor’s interest in a pension plan was not property of the estate, and thus it could not used to secure the IRS’s claim for delinquent taxes in his chapter 13 case.  This is so, even though the IRS is not subject to ERISA’s antialienation provisions.

In re Bevan, 327 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2003)
           Senior lienholder who bids in amount of deed of trust into foreclosure, takes possession of the property, then pays off amount of IRS lien is not equitably subrogated to the rights of the IRS in the debtor’s chapter 13 case.

In re Beam, 192 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1999)
    The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of the district court. The court held that a Ch. 13 bankruptcy trustee must honor an IRS notice of levy on funds deposited by the debtor toward a proposed plan that is not confirmed.

In re Greatwood, 194 B.R. 637 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996), aff’d. 120 F.3d 268 (9th Cir. 1997)
    Tax protestor cannot maintain Chapter 13 proceedings to dispose of debt to IRS - statements in lieu of returns not adequate

In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996)
    Prior to Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Ninth Circuit case law dictated that, in Chapter 13 cases, IRS priority claim disallowed as untimely

In re Heath, 182 B.R. 557 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
    In order to require Chapter 13 debtor to commit to plan all tax refunds debtor receives during plan’s term, trustee must make minimal showing that debtor may receive tax refunds

9. §109

In re Guastella, 341 B.R. 908 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)
    Tentative decision quantified the amount of the debt the debtor would be liable for in an amount certain.  The debt was thus liquidated, since is was readily ascertainable.  The court correctly looked beyond the schedules to determine the amount of the debt (which was listed as $0) and correctly determined that the schedules were not filed in good faith.

In re Slack, 187 F.3d 1070, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 1999)
    “. . .[A] debt is liquidated if the amount is readily ascertainable, notwithstanding the fact that the question of liability has not been finally decided.”

In re Nicholes, 184 B.R. 82, 99-91 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995)
    “Construing Sylvester with Wenberg and Loya, we hold that the fact that a claim is disputed does not per se exclude the claim from the eligibility calculation under § 109(e), since a disputed claim is not necessarily unliquidated.  So long as a debt is subject to ready determination and precision in computation of the amount due, the it is considered liquidated and included for eligibility purposes under § 109(e) regardless of any dispute. On the other hand, if the dispute itself makes the claim difficult to ascertain or prevents the ready determination of the amount due, the debt is unliquidated and excluded from the § 109(e) computation.”

In re Carty, 149 B.R. 601 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993)
    109(g) 180 day period not tolled or renewed between time of second filing and time when motion to dismiss heard, at least based on equities of the case (10 months lapse between second filing and motion to dismiss)

10. §1322

In re Frazier, 377 B.R. 621 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    Curing of a default as to a Montana contract for deed was governed by § 1322(b)(3), not the 60-day limitation in § 108(b).

In re Enewally, 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 669 (2004)
    Lien stripping cannot be accomplished under § 1322(b)(2) unless the lien will be paid off within the life of the plan.

In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002)
    A wholly unsecured lienholder is not entitled to the protections of § 1322(b)(2);  The holding of In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997) approved.

In re Labib-Kiyarash, 271 B.R. 189 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001)
    Student loan that will extend beyond the life of the plan is a “long-term debt” for purposes of § 1322(b)(5). Debtor could separately classify such a student loan and pay it in full “outside” the plan if the classification meets the fairness test under § 1322(b)(1). 

In re Hill, 268 B.R. 548 (9th Cir. B.A.P.  2001)
    Mother whose credit cards were used by debtor daughter was not “liable with” the debtor, and thus § 1322(b)(1) dealing with separate classification of co-debtor debt was inapplicable.

In re Lee, 215 B.R. 22 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
    First deed of trust on real estate and appliances can’t be stripped under 1322(b)(2)

In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
    Bankruptcy debtors entitled to treat wholly unsecured deed of trust as unsecured lien

In re Lievsay, 199 B.R. 705 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1149 (1998)
    Boilerplate language in deed of trust does not eviscerate § 1322(b)
   
In re Reeves, 164 B.R. 766 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
    § 1322(b)(2) applies to nonpurchase money home loans

In re Proudfoot, 144 B.R. 876 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992)
    Garcia (sp?) Reaffirmed - cannot confirm a plan which calls for no regular payments pending sale of house without violating 1322(b0(2)

11. §1325

In re Pluma, 303 B.R. 444 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003), affd, 427 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005)
    Under § 1325(a)(5)(B), bankruptcy court appropriately applied the “formula” approach for setting an interest rate, whereby a base rate is determined, and then increases the rate based on the risk of default by the debtor and the nature of the security.  However, the court failed to consider all of the default risks with this particular debtor.

In re Cavanagh, 250 B.R. 107 (9th Cir. B.AP. 2000)
    Under the amendments made to § 1325(b)(2)(A) by the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, “a court is not supposed to engage in a separate analysis to determine whether charitable contributions up to fifteen percent are reasonably necessary for the debtor's maintenance and support.”  However, a court should look at the debtor's purpose in commencing or increasing the amount of tithing on the eve of or shortly after filing for bankruptcy for purposes of determining whether a chapter

12.  §1325(hanging paragraph)

In re Penrod, 392 B.R. 835 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)
    1) A lender’s payoff of the deficiency on the trade-in is not secured by the purchase money security interest in the new car, and is not thereby protected by the hanging paragraph.
    2) “[T]he hanging paragraph protects that portion of the lender’s debt allocable to the car purchased, and does not protect that portion of the debt that is allocable to negative equity.”

In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    The “hanging paragraph” does not affect a 910 secured creditor’s right to seek a deficiency claim upon surrender of the vehicle.

In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)
    Under the  “hanging paragraph,” chapter 13  debtor was required  to pay the full contract price of his automobile.  Trial court held that  § 1322(b) remained applicable, and the debtor could alter the interest rate and monthly payments. The BAP did not address this issue, since the creditor did not pursue it on appeal.

13. Student Loans

In re Ransom, 336 B.R. 790 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)
    Chapter 13 plan which prohibited student loan creditor from collecting accrued interest after completion of the plan was a de facto discharge of the student loan debt, for which an adversary proceeding was required and a finding of undue hardship.  Thus, the provision is unenforceable.

In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998), aff’d, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)
    Student loan creditor waived claim to postpetition interest by failing to object to discharge provision of debtor’s Chapter 13 plan before plan’s confirmation.
    “In summary, the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that a holder of a nondischargeable student loan was precluded from collecting postpetition interest on this debt if the creditor’s allowed claim is paid in full pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.  We are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bruning and reject the bankruptcy court’s reliance on Wasson.
    “However, this error was harmless given the facts of this case.  Although the Plan should not have been confirmed because it included the Discharge Provision, which was inconsistent with the Code, once confirmed, it was res judicata and binding on Appellant.  Additionally, Appellant’s failure to object to the Plan at the confirmation hearing constituted an implied acceptance of the Plan.  By failing to appeal the Confirmation Order and having impliedly accepted the Plan, Appellant cannot now collaterally attack the Plan.  Accordingly, we affirm.”

In re Sperna, 173 B.R. 654, (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994)
    Nondischargeability of student loan not per se reasonable basis for discriminatory treatment of other unsecured debts in Chapter 13 proceeding.

14. Fees

In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006)
    1) No-look presumptive fees do not violate 11 U.S.C. § 330; 2) the bankruptcy court’s criteria for awarding additional fees beyond the no-look fee did not violate § 330; and 3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse it’s discretion in ruling on fees without a hearing.

In re Johnson, 344 B.R. 104 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)
     Chapter 13 plan providing that attorneys’ fees remaining unpaid at the completion of the case would not be discharged is not inconsistent with any provision in Title 11.

15.  Discharge–§ 1328

In re Ryan, 389 B.R. 710 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)
    Costs of prosecution are not criminal fines under § 1328(a)(3) and are thus dischargeable.

16. Misc

In re Croston, 313 B.R. 447 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004)
    Debtors had an absolute right to convert from chapter 7 to chapter 13.

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004)
    Formula approach for setting interest rate based on prime rate adjusted for risk of nonpayment was appropriate cramdown rate of interest.

In re Steinacher, 283 B.R. 768 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002)
    Local LA rule requiring debtors to pay all past due mortgage payments from previous chapter 13 was invalid.

In re Slack, 187 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)
    Held that a debt is liquidated if the amount is readily ascertainable, notwithstanding the fact that the question of liability has not been finally decided.

In re Soderlund, 236 B.R. 271 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999)
    Unsecured portion of secured creditor’s claim should be counted as unsecured debt for determining chapter 13 eligibility.

In re Beguelin, 220 B.R. 94 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)
    Chapter 13 creditor may recover interest at federal judgment rate from date of petition through and beyond plan’s confirmation where estate was solvent. 
    “The bankruptcy court’s oral order lifting the automatic stay clearly allowed Volcano to obtain a judgment in its pending state court action against the debtor that included an award of attorney’s fees and costs.  The order lifting the stay is AFFIRMED.
    “The bankruptcy court’s determination that Volcano was entitled to postpetition interest on its claim from the date of the debtor’s petition through and beyond the effective date of the confirmed Chapter 13 plan (“gap interest”) is AFFIRMED.
    “The bankruptcy court’s determination that the state law rate of interest was the “legal rate” applicable to Volcano’s claim under § 726(a)(5) is REVERSED.  We hold that “interest at the legal rate” under § 726(a)(5) is measured by the federal judgment rate.  The matter is remanded for a recomputation...

In re Smith, 207 B.R. 888 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996)
    Life insurance premiums may be necessary expense under chapter 13 even when not required by law

In re Beltran, 177 B.R. 905 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1995), reversed 81 F.3d 167 (9th Cir. 1996)
    State filed claim should have been allowed on authority of In re Pacific & Atlantic Trading Co.
   
In re Barnes, 32 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1994)
    Court may not confirm plan of reorganization where value of property to be distributed during term of plan on account of allowed secured claim is less than allowed amount of claim

In re West, 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994)
    The debtors’ joint Chapter 13 case suspended the running of § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)’s 240-day priority period from the date of the bankruptcy petition until six months after the case was dismissed pursuant to I.R.C. § 6503.  The IRS claims are therefore entitled to priority.

In re Martin, 156 B.R. 47 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993)
    1. 60 month period of second filing does not commence from date of first filing
    2. Must be cause for cure period to extend beyond 36 months

In re Tucker, 989 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1993)
    Where debtors concealed $7000, used 6500 to increase equity in house, findings required on creditor’s objection.

In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1991)
    Failure to notify creditor that arrearages as stated in plan would be binding - violation of due process

In re Laguna , 944 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 966 (1992)
    In absence of language in promissory note, payment of interest on arrearages was a cure, not modification

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