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Memorandum of Decision Re: Retroactive Employment
A court of equity is seldom justified in disregarding quantum meruit. . . . The rule of automatic, in- variable and total forfeiture of fee is made all the more inappropriate in cases such as the present one by the difficulty of deciding who is or is not a "profes- sional person" subject to section 327(a) - this is a terrible thing to do to one who has given good service in good faith merely because his opinion on an obscure and difficult point of law differs from that of the judge. There is no need, at this time, to delve into the issue of whether Hillsdale is a professional within the meaning of section 327. Assuming that Hillsdale is a professional without deciding the issue, the court will approve its employment retroactively in order to avoid the windfall the creditors seek at Hillsdale's expense. Retroactive approval of employment is permitted where there is a satisfactory explanation of the failure to obtain timely employment and there has been a substantial benefit to the estate. In re THC Financial Corp., 837 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the benefit is clear and compelling. The explanation is equally clear; Hilldale was not a regular bankruptcy professional, and its status as an insider not clear. Lack of sophistication in bankruptcy law may be considered in deciding if there are appropriate circumstances excusing failure to get a timely order. In re Crest Mirror & Door Co., Inc., 57 B.R. 830, 833 (9th Cir.BAP 1986); Matter of Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc., 108 B.R. 366, 369 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga.1989). Numerous other factors excuse Hilldale's failure to obtain a timely order. These include the exigent need to provide care to the patients; the justifiable reliance on the trustee to take care of the formalities of employment; and the lack of prejudice to anyone (unless one calls failure to obtain a windfall prejudice) if retroactive employment is approved. See Crest Mirror, supra; Matter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3rd Cir.1986). The objecting parties argue that even if extraordinary circumstances exist which justify retroactive approval of employment, the motion cannot be granted because Hillsdale was not eligible to be employed. The court sees no basis for this position. Section 327(a) places two requirements on professionals who are to be employed by the estate. First, they must be disinterested persons. That phrase is defined by section 101(14); none of its provisions fit Hillsdale. Second, they must not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate. No such adverse interest is apparent. A few days prior to bankruptcy, Hillsdale was appointed by the state court to be a receiver for one of the debtor's nursing homes. As a result of the Chapter 11 filing, it never took possession of the home or its records. It performed no work as receiver, and has no claim against the debtor or any other principal party to this bankruptcy. It had no contacts with the secured creditor seeking a receiver prior to its appointment. The appointment of Hillsdale as receiver under such circumstances did not disqualify Hillsdale from being employed by the trustee. For the foregoing reasons, the motion for retroactive approval of employment will be granted. Hillsdale of course serves at the pleasure of the trustee, who can terminate the employment at any time. Like any other order approving employment, the order the court will enter will be subject to vacation if it turns out that Hillsdale failed to disclose a connection with any of the parties to this case. Counsel for Hillsdale shall submit an appropriate form of order. Dated: June 30, 1995 _______________________ Alan Jaroslovsky U.S. Bankruptcy |
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