IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re
CHARLES F. SHAW VINEYARD & No. 91-12712
WINERY, LTD.,
Debtor.
___________________________/
CHARLES E. SIMS, Trustee,
Plaintiff,
v. A.P. No. 93-1118
KORBRAND CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
Memorandum of Decision
Prior to its bankruptcy, debtor Shaw Vineyard & Winery, Ltd., produced wine made from its
own grapes and the grapes of other growers. It had an outstanding loan from Napa Valley Bank
secured by its real property and other assets, including inventory and receivables.
Shaw had entered into an agreement with Kobrand Corporation whereby Kobrand had
exclusive rights to market Shaw's wine. In addition, Kobrand loaned Shaw $500,000.00 secured
by a junior deed to Shaw's real property.
In late 1991, within 90 days of Shaw's bankruptcy, Kobrand took possession of wine made
by Shaw which had been produced from grapes grown by the Batteullo Family Trust, Thomas
Kenefick, and Craig Battuello. Shaw filed its bankruptcy petition before receiving any payment
from Kobrand.
This adversary proceeding is a four-way dispute between the bankruptcy trustee, Kobrand,
the bank, and the growers. Kobrand asserts that it has the right to offset what it owes for wine
(about $738,000.00) against Shaw's debt to it. The growers take the position that the
$450,000.00 due from Kobrand on account of the wine is subject to the growers' statutory liens
of $247,000.00.
The trustee takes the position that the growers' liens are valid but avoidable and he is accordingly
entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the wine. The bank takes the position that the growers
no longer have a lien, that Kobrand is not entitled to an offset, and that it is entitled to the entire
$738,000.00 on account of its security interest in the Shaw's receivables.
Now before the court are several motions having in common one specific issue: whether the
growers' liens evaporated when Kobrand took possession of the wine. For the reasons stated
below, the court finds that the liens have not survived.
California Food and Agriculture Code section 55631 et seq. give the growers a statutory lien
on the wine. Section 55634 provides that the lien "is on . . . any processed form of the product
. . . which is in the possession of the processor without segregation of the product." Section
55638 forbids the sale of product subject to the lien unless the proceeds of the sale are used to
satisfy the liens. Notwithstanding section 55638, Kobrand and the bank argue that because the
wine is no longer in Shaw's possession the liens have been extinguished.
The two cases discussed at length by all parties,
In re Loretto Winery, 898 F.2d 715 (9th
Cir.1990), and
In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., 910 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.1990), both stand for
the principle that the growers' lien laws should be interpreted liberally to protect growers.
However, the issue now before this court is whether the growers' lien laws can be interpreted in
a liberal enough matter to give the lien effect when the produce has been transferred to a third
party who has not paid for them. Dicta in both
Loretto and
Richards support the plain meaning
of the statute that possession by the processor is the
sine qua non for assertion of growers' lien
rights.
Although it has tried, the court can find no basis for avoiding the express language of the
statute that the lien is dependent on possession. The agricultural lien laws are obviously the
source of considerable negotiation and compromise between growers, producers and lenders; the
court would be denigrating the validity of the legislative process by reading into the law
something more than is there.
This does not necessarily mean that the growers are without a remedy. The transfer of the
wine to Kobrand was unlawful pursuant to Food and Agriculture Code section 55638 and a
misdemeanor pursuant to section 55905. Where a processor delivers produce to a third person
as a credit against a debt to him, there is authority that the third person may be liable as a joint
tortfeaser to a lienholder if he took with knowledge of the lien. See 3 C.J.S., Agriculture, section
114, p.657; 5 Witkin,
Summary of California Law (9th Ed.), Torts, section 9, p.65-66.
Moreover, if the transfer of the wine to Kobrand is avoided as a preference or otherwise the
growers' liens might be revived.
1 See
In re Antinarelli Enterprises, Inc., 107 B.R. 410, 415-16
(D.Mass.1989).
This case involves complex issues, vague law, and important rights. The only patently
meritless position taken by any of the parties is Kobrand's request for sanctions. Regardless of
what Kobrand has or has not done yet, the trustee's complaint validly puts the issue of Kobrand's
setoff rights before the court. Kobrand's request for sanctions will be denied, and Kobrand is
advised not to request sanctions again without cause. Its motion for summary judgment against
the trustee will be denied as premature.
There are many issues remaining to be decided in this case, and perhaps pleadings to be
amended; final disposition is not yet appropriate. However, it shall be deemed without
substantial controversy, pursuant to FRCP 56(d), that the growers have no lien on the wine in
Kobrand's possession or the proceeds of the sale of the wine because by statute the liens are
dependent on the producer's possession and do not extend to proceeds. Except for this ruling,
the motions now before the court will be denied without prejudice as premature. Counsel for the
trustee shall submit an appropriate form of order, which counsel for Kobrand, the bank, and the
growers have approved as to form.
Dated: February 14, 1994 ___________________________
Alan Jaroslovsky
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
________
1. Kobrand asserts that the delivery of the wine to it was in the normal course of business, and
accordingly immune from attack as a preference. The court is skeptical that an illegal transfer
can ever be considered to be in the ordinary course of bus