| DO NOT PUBLISH
This case disposition has no value as precedent and is not intended for publication. Any publication, either in print or electronically, is contrary to the intent and wishes of the court.
|
Decisions
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re
EDWARD NOTARIUS and PATRICIA No. 93-11650
SCHWEIZER,
  Debtors.
___________________________/
EDWARD NOTARIUS and PATRICIA
SCHWEIZER,
Plaintiffs,
v. A.P. No. 94-1368
DAVID and MARIANNE NEUFELD,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Memorandum of Decision
The parties to this adversary proceeding were the parties to a prior adversary proceeding in
this court. After a full day of trial, they announced a settlement on the record. The agreement
called for Chapter 12 debtors Notarius and Schweizer to abandon their home and vineyard to
the Neufelds in return for the Neufelds' promises to make payments to them within a short time
thereafter.
Notarius and Schweizer commenced this second adversary proceeding when, after they had
left their home as promised, the Neufelds refused to make their payments. By this adversary
proceeding, Notarius and Schweizer seek to enforce the Notarius' obligations under the
settlement agreement which resolved the prior adversary proceeding.
When this matter came on for trial, the Neufelds made an oral motion to dismiss this
adversary proceeding based on the just-published decision of the Court of Appeals in
In re
Hunter, -- F.3d -- (9th Cir.1995). The court noted from the bench that the decision did not
discuss the jurisdictional basis for this action, 28 U.S.C. section 1334(b), which gives the
district court (and through reference the bankruptcy court) jurisdiction over all civil proceedings
arising in or related to a bankruptcy case. However, the facts seemed similar enough that it
seemed to make sense to dismiss the action without prejudice so that the parties would not risk
litigating the issues twice. The debtors' motion for reconsideration is now before the court.
Unfortunately, the court did not have time to reflect on the motion to dismiss made at the
trial. It remembered only later that this case had been very extensively litigated before it came
to trial. Not only had the court summarily found that the Neufelds had failed to make
immediate payments as they had agreed, but the court had even entered a judgment on that
claim pursuant to FRCP 54(b). In addition, there was an interlocutory appeal to the district
court which was fully prepared and argued and a decision rendered.
Thus, by dismissing the case the court would not be saving the parties time and money but
rather rendering useless a very substantial amount of litigation. While these factors have
nothing to do with whether or not there is jurisdiction, they do compel the court to make sure
that there is no jurisdiction before dismissing the case at this point. Upon reflection, the court
finds jurisdiction even in light of
Hunter.
Hunter is distinguishable on at least three grounds. First, the original adversary proceeding
in that case was a dischargeability action brought by the creditor and did not involve the
debtor's estate, whereas in this case the original action was brought by the debtors, alleging
fraud against the Neufelds, and raised issues central to their reorganization. Moreover, at the
time the debtors commenced this second action they
needed the settlement money to perform
under their plan. The fact that the partial judgment the court entered has resulted in enough of
a recovery to allow the debtors to perform under their plan does not destroy jurisdiction to hear
the rest of the case; jurisdiction is determined as of the time the action was commenced.
In re
Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457n2 (9th Cir.1988).
Second, the settlement agreement in the first adversary agreement was in essence an
agreement by the debtors to sell the principal asset of their estate to the Neufelds. Not only
does this court have jurisdiction to hear actions brought to enforce such agreements, but it may
hear them as core matters.
In re Harris Pine Mills, 44 F.3d 1431, 1437-38 (9th Cir.1995).
Hunter did not involve a sale or transfer of estate assets.
Third, there is no indication in
Hunter that the base case was still open, so that there was no
pending bankruptcy case to which the second adversary proceeding could be related. In this
case, the Chapter 12 proceedings are still open. Moreover, the confirmed plan specifically
provides for the court to exercise jurisdiction over actions brought by the debtors to enforce
their plan.
The Supreme Court has recently held that while the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.
section 1334(b) is not limitless, it is nonetheless expansive and may include any action whose
outcome could conceivably have an effect on the bankruptcy estate, especially in reorganization
cases.
Celotex Corp. v Edwards, -- U.S. --, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995). When
this adversary proceeding was commenced, its outcome was crucial to the performance of the
debtors' plan. Even now that the plan has been substantially performed, thanks to partial relief
the court has already granted, this adversary proceeding is sufficiently related to the Chapter
12 case to establish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court will grant the debtors' motion and
vacate its decision to dismiss. Counsel for the debtors shall submit an appropriate form of
order, which shall provide that a status conference will be held on November 27, 1995, at 2:00
P.M.
Dated: October 8, 1995 _______________________
Alan Jaroslovsky
U.S. Bankruptcy