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8	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	In re:	) Chapter 11 Cases ) Nos. 98-33952-TC
12	L.R. HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, and	98-33953-TC
13	LYON'S RESTAURANTS, INC., a Delaware corporation,	) [Jointly Administered for ) Procedural Purposes Only Under]
14	Debtors.	Case No. 98-33952-TC
15		) Case No. 90-33932-1C
16	ROYAL FOODS CO.,	Adv. No. 98-3412-TC
17	Plaintiff,	
18	vs.	) ) )
19	L.R. HOLDINGS, INC., and LYON'S RESTAURANTS, INC.,	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
20	Defendants.	) )
21		)
22		
23	The court held a hearing regarding Plaintiff's Third Motion	
24	for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2002. Stephen P. McCarron	
25	appeared for Plaintiff Royal Foods Co. (Royal Foods). Terrence V	
26	Ponsford appeared for Defendant and Intervenor, U.S. Bank National	

Association (Bank).

MEMORANDUM RE PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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#### BACKGROUND

Royal Foods delivered perishable commodities to Lyon's Restaurants. Lyon's filed a chapter 11 petition on September 9, 1998, owing Royal Foods more than \$1.2 million. Lyon's sold its assets in the chapter 11 case for \$22.6 million. Bank holds a valid lien on the sale proceeds securing a debt of more than \$25 million. Royal Foods contends that it has a claim to the sale proceeds superior to that of the Bank under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq. (PACA).

This court denied Royal Foods' first motion for summary judgment upon the legal conclusion that restaurants are not subject to PACA. The district court reversed, holding that a restaurant is a "dealer" subject to PACA if its buys perishable commodities in "jobbing quantities."

This court granted Royal Foods' second motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought a determination that Lyon's bought produce in "jobbing quantities" and was thus a "dealer" in perishable commodities subject to PACA. The court determined that the second summary judgment motion did not properly request any further relief.

In the present motion, Royal Foods seeks summary judgment on all remaining issues. I determine that Royal Foods is entitled to recover the amount of \$1,844,261.

### I. WHETHER ROYAL FOODS PRESERVED ITS RIGHTS UNDER PACA

Royal Foods contends that Lyon's owes it \$1,220,025 for perishable commodities delivered in 1998. Gummow declaration, ¶ 4.

Bank does not contest this claim. Declaration of William C.

Kosturos, ¶ 6 & Exhibit B. Nor does Bank deny that Royal Foods
has a superior claim to the sales proceeds to the extent those
proceeds are held in trust for Royal Foods under PACA.

Bank does contend, however, that only \$207,313 of the amount due is payable from funds held in trust under PACA. Bank asserts that Royal Foods failed to preserve its PACA rights with respect to deliveries before May 26, 1998, by failing to provide Lyon's timely notice that the deliveries were subject to PACA. Bank also notes that Lyon's paid Royal Foods \$1,012,712 after May 26, 1998. Declaration of William C. Kosturos, ¶ 7. If this payment is applied to post-May 26<sup>th</sup> deliveries, the amount due for those deliveries is no more than \$207,313. Royal Foods should not be permitted to apply the payment to pre-May 26<sup>th</sup> deliveries, Bank argues, because such application would allow Royal Foods to receive a preferential payment on a general unsecured claim.

The Bank's argument is unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth below, I determine that Lyon's preserved its PACA rights regarding all deliveries, and that the entire amount of its unpaid claim, whether for pre- or post-May 26<sup>th</sup> deliveries, is payable from funds held in trust under PACA.

PACA provides that any dealer who receives perishable commodities holds all proceeds of those commodities in trust for the supplier until "full payment of the sums owing in connection with such transactions has been received by such unpaid suppliers...."

7 U.S.C.§ 499e(c)(2). The unpaid seller, however, "shall lose the benefits of such trust unless such person has given written notice

of intent to preserve the benefits of the trust" to the dealer.  $\underline{\text{Id.}}$  at § 499(e)(c)(3). Such notice may be provided in the invoice sent to the dealer for the commodities in question.  $\underline{\text{Id.}}$  at § 499e(c)(4).

Bank does not contend that the PACA notice contained in the post-May 26<sup>th</sup> invoices is insufficient, or that Royal Foods failed to take any other step necessary to preserve its PACA rights regarding post-May 26<sup>th</sup> deliveries. Bank's sole contention is that Royal Foods failed to provide the required PACA notice regarding pre-May 26<sup>th</sup> deliveries. See Bank Group's Opposition to Plaintiff's Third Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-6.

I determine that Royal Foods has established beyond genuine dispute that all the Royal Foods invoices contained the PACA notice. In so determining, I note the following.

The Gummow declaration expressly states that every invoice Royal Foods sent to Lyon's contained the PACA notice. Declaration of George Gummow ¶¶ 6 & 7. The exhibits to the Gummow declaration contain many of these invoices. <u>Id.</u> ¶ 8. Each invoice is on a standard form that contains the PACA notice. Among these invoices are several sent before May 26, 1998. These pre-May 26<sup>th</sup> invoices are on the same standard form containing the PACA notice.

The only evidence submitted by Bank suggesting that any pre-May 26<sup>th</sup> invoices did not contain the PACA notice is the declaration of John Ghuzzi. The focus of that declaration is whether Lyon's became obligated to pay 18 percent interest on invoices not paid within 30 days. Ghuzzi states that Lyon's had consistently paid up to 120 days after shipment, and that he and Gummow never discussed

interest on delinquent invoices. In the course of the declaration, Ghuzzi states: "In May 1998, Mr. Gummow presented me with a letter agreement by which, for the first time, Royal Foods claimed that it was selling its produce to Lyons under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act." The Ghuzzi declaration is attached to this decision as Appendix A.

The Ghuzzi declaration does not effectively controvert the Gummow declaration. Mr. Ghuzzi does not directly address whether Royal Foods' pre-May 26th invoices contained PACA notices. Ghuzzi's statement that Royal Foods "claimed" for the first time in the May 26th letter agreement that its sales were covered by PACA is too vague to controvert: [i] Gummow's very specific statement that every Royal Foods invoice contained the PACA notice; and [ii] Gummow's authentication of numerous pre- and post-May 26th invoices, all of which are printed on the same standard form containing the PACA notice.

# II. WHETHER ALL OF THE FUNDS RESERVED ARE SUBJECT TO THE PACA TRUST

Bank next contends that only a small portion of the funds from which Royal Foods seeks payment are proceeds from the sale of perishable commodities held in trust for Royal Foods. Bank asserts that perishable commodities constituted no more than 6.31% of Lyon's cost of goods sold. Bank argues further that the only assets that can be considered proceeds of perishable commodities are Lyon's cash, inventory, and receivables as of the petition date, which total \$1,488,828. The proceeds of perishables held in

trust for Royal Foods, Bank argues, therefore constitute only 6.31% of this \$1,488,828, or \$93,999.

The Bank's argument misconstrues the tracing rules established in the caselaw construing PACA. A PACA claimant is not required to trace the proceeds of perishable commodities. In re Kornblum & Co., 81 F.3d 280, 284-87 (2nd Cir. 1996); <u>In re Richmond Produce</u> Co., 112 B.R. 364, 378-79 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990); <u>In re Fresh</u> Approach, Inc., 51 B.R. 412, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1985). PACA trust presumptively applies to all assets used in the producerelated business. <u>Kornblum</u>, <u>supra</u>, 81 F.3d at 284-87. The burden is upon the competing claimant to show that any such assets were paid for from a source other than the proceeds of perishable commodities. Id. In the cases relied upon by bank, the competing claimant proved that a certain portion of revenues derived from a non-produce-related business. See Six L's Packing Co. v. West Des Moines State Bank, 967 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1992); Richmond Produce, supra, 112 B.R. at 378-79.

In the present case, Bank has not shown that the assets sold were purchased with funds other than the proceeds of the not-yet-paid-for perishables. Bank has also not shown that any of the income was derived from a non-produce-related business. Bank has shown only that the cost of produce was a small portion of the cost of operating a business that is clearly produce-related. Even in the paradigm PACA case, a cannery, the cost of produce does not represent the only cost involved in the preparation of the finished product. The direct costs of canning also include rent, machinery, labor, and canning supplies. Yet no court has held that

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# III. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

are subject to Royal Foods' PACA claim.

Royal Foods seeks prejudgment interest on all sums due at the rate of 18 percent. Royal Foods relies upon the following language in its standard-form invoice. "TERMS: All accounts are due and payable in 30 days. A delinquency charge of 11/2% per month or 18% per annum will be charged on accounts over 30 days" (emphasis in original). Royal Foods notes that Lyon's never objected to the invoice provision regarding interest.

the PACA trust applies only to a portion of the proceeds of the

canned goods. Therefore, the entire amount of the sale proceeds

Bank argues that summary judgment may not be granted regarding prejudgment interest, because a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether the interest provision of the invoice became a part of the contract between the Royal Foods and Lyons. Bank submitted evidence that Royal Foods never attempted to recover interest before the current action, even though Lyon's payments were consistently 90 days late. Declaration of John Ghuzzi, ¶ 3-7. Furthermore, the May 26, 1998 letter agreement between Royal Foods and Lyons provides for attorneys fees, but does not provide for interest on delinquent payments. See copy of letter agreement attached hereto as part of Appendix A.

I agree with Bank that these circumstances create a triable issue of fact as to whether the invoice language fixing interest at

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 $<sup>^{</sup> ext{ iny I}}$ It is worthy of note that the Lyon's claim is less than ten percent of the proceeds of the sale of the restaurant.

18 percent: (1) became part of the contract between the parties under Section 2207 of the California Commercial Code; (2) was waived by Royal Foods' failure to enforce it; or (3) was suspended by the May  $26^{\rm th}$  letter agreement.

That the interest rate specified in the Royal Foods invoices may not be enforceable, however, does not mean that Royal Foods is not entitled to recover prejudgment interest. It is beyond dispute that the amounts owed to Royal Foods arise from Lyon's breach of a contract. Under California law, Royal Foods is entitled to recover prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent. Section 3287 of the California Civil Code provides in relevant part:

- (a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day....
- (b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.

Section 3289(b) of the Civil Code provides:

"If a contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach."

This state law rate, not the Federal judgment rate, should apply in the present case. Although the general rule is that a Federal court should award prejudgment interest at the rate fixed in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 for post-judgment interest, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that in a diversity action prejudgment interest should be awarded at the rate fixed by applicable state law. See

Citicorp Real Estate v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2 1998); AT&T v. United Computer Systems, 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996); Northrop Corp. v. Triad International Marketing, 3 842 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988). For this purpose, the present 4 action is the equivalent of a diversity action, because it is in 5 substance a breach of contract action. Although PACA provides 6 7 Royal Foods certain remedies in addition to those available under state law, those remedies are intended only to enable Royal Foods 9 to enforce its rights under state law to recover "the sums owing in 10 connection with such transactions." See 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2). Because PACA itself does not address attorneys fees or prejudgment 11 12 interest, the courts look to state law regarding these questions. See JC Produce v. Paragon Steakhouse Restaurants, 70 F.Supp. 2d 13 14 1119, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 15 Royal Foods seeks prejudgment interest from October 1, 1998. 16 This is an appropriate date from which to calculate interest. 17

Royal Foods seeks prejudgment interest from October 1, 1998. This is an appropriate date from which to calculate interest. First, Royal Foods became entitled to recover portions of the total amount due on many different dates. Thus, to calculate prejudgment interest precisely would be very time-consuming, because it would require calculating interest separately for the amount due under each invoice. Second, it appears that the vast majority of the debt became due between July 1, 1998 and October 8, 1998.<sup>2</sup> In choosing October 1, 1998 as the start date, Royal Foods has

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of George Gummow shows that the overwhelming majority of invoices were dated between June 1, 1998 and September 8, 1998, and were spread evenly over that period. Under the May 26, 1998 letter agreement, payment was due 30 days from receipt.

calculated prejudgment interest in a manner that is advantageous to 2 3 4

interest from October 1, 1998. Prejudgment interest on the principal amount of \$1,220,025 at

of this decision equals \$446,285.

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#### IV. ATTORNEYS FEES

Each Royal Foods invoice contained the following language regarding attorneys fees: "Customers agree to pay all court costs and reasonable attorneys fees, and/or reasonable collection costs on all past due accounts." Bank submitted no evidence that Lyon's ever objected to the attorney fee provision in the invoices.

Bank as well as convenient. I exercise the discretion afforded me

the rate of 10 percent per annum from October 1, 1998 to the date

under Section 3287 of the Civil Code to calculate prejudgment

The May 26, 1998 letter agreement between Royal foods and Lyon's contain the following provision regarding attorneys fees. "In the event it becomes necessary to commence legal action to collect the sums due under such transactions, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred thereby." This letter agreement was signed on behalf of Lyon's by its president and CEO, John Ghuzzi.

Royal Foods has submitted declarations and timesheets from its counsel indicating that to date Royal Foods has incurred fees and costs totalling \$177,951 in seeking to collect from Lyon's.

Bank does not challenge the reasonableness of the fees incurred. Rather, Bank argues that some of the deliveries were

made before the May 26<sup>th</sup> letter agreement and are thus not subject to that agreement. The Bank also argues that the current proceeding is not "an action to collect the sums due," but is instead a dispute as to whether the deliveries to Lyon's were subject to PACA. Both of Bank's arguments are unpersuasive.

It does not matter whether the present action concerns deliveries made before or after the May 26<sup>th</sup> letter agreement, because the fee provision in Royal Foods' invoices applies to all deliveries. Section 2207 of the California Commercial Code provides in relevant part:

- (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
- (2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
- (a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
  - (b) They materially alter it; or
- (c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

Bank offered no evidence that Lyon's raised any objection to the fee provision in Royal Foods' invoices. Nor did Lyon's engage in any conduct inconsistent with the enforceability of that fee provision--Lyon's never pursued collection without claiming fees. Finally, in the May 26<sup>th</sup> letter agreement, Lyon's expressly agreed

to a similar fee clause. Thus, the fee clause in Royal Foods' invoices became part of the contract under section 2207.

The argument that Lyon's is not entitled to recover attorneys fees because the current proceeding is not an action to collect sums due under the contract is frivolous. Royal Foods seeks nothing except payment for the produce delivered to Lyon's. That Lyon's asserted certain federal law remedies in that action does not change the essential character of the action. See JC Produce, supra, 70 F.Supp at 1123.

#### V. FUNDS FROM WHICH ROYAL FOODS MAY RECOVER

Bank argues that it is not liable for any amount due that exceeds the \$1.7 million set aside under a prior order to pay Royal Foods' allowed PACA claim. Bank relies upon language in Article V.C. of the confirmed plan, which states that Royal Foods shall be paid from the \$1.7 million account. This argument is unpersuasive.

The Ninth Circuit has held that under 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), a chapter 11 plan of reorganization may not discharge liabilities of a non-debtor. See In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996). Ninth Circuit decisions do give res judicata effect to provisions of a confirmed plan no longer subject to appeal, even if the plan should not have been confirmed. See Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 1995). A court, however, should not enforce plan language that purports to grant a discharge broader than that provided for in the

Bankruptcy Code, unless the plan language clearly compels such a result. <u>In re Miller</u>, 253 B.R. 455, 459-60 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000). The plan language cited by Bank does not provide clearly that Bank's liability to Royal Foods is limited by the plan.

Bank remains liable for the entire amount Lyon's owed Royal Foods, because Bank received approximately \$22 million proceeds from the sale of Lyon's produce-related restaurant business. Under the principles described in parts I and II, Bank holds the entire amount of these proceeds in trust for Royal Foods until Royal Foods receives full payment for the perishable commodities delivered to Lyon's.

## CONCLUSION

Summary judgment is granted in favor of Royal Foods as follows. Royal Foods shall recover the sum of \$1,844,261, which includes prejudgment interest, fees, and costs. This amount shall be paid first from the \$1.7 million previously set aside for this purpose and any interest earned on that amount. Any remaining amount shall be paid by Bank. The court reserves for trial the question whether Royal Foods is entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate of 18 percent.

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Dated: <u>August 28, 2002</u>

Thomas E. Carlson
United States Bankruptcy Judge